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ABSTRACT
We argue thatlong-termdebt has a role in controlling management's ability to finance
future investments. A company with high (widely-held) debt will find it hard to raise capital.
since new security holders will have low priority relative to existing creditors. Conversely for
a company with low debt We show there is an optimal debt-equity ratio and mix of senior and
junior debt if management undertakes unprofitable as well as profitable investments. We derive
conditions under which equity and a single class of senior long-term debt work as well as more
complex conuacts for controlling investment behavior.
Oliver Hart John Moore
Department of Economics London School of Economics
Littauer Center 220 Houghton Street
Harvard University London WC2A 2AE
Cambridge, MA 02138 UNITED KINGDOM
and NBERSince the time of Modigliani and Miller's famous irrelevance theorem,
economists have devoted much effort to relaxing the theorem's assumptions in
order to understand the real-world trade—offs between debt, equity and other
corporate financial instruments. In particular, literatures have developed
thatexplain the issuance of debt by public companiesas an attempt to reduce
taxes(see,e.g. •FrancoModigliani and Kerton Miller (1963) and Miller
(1977)); as asignalling device (see, e.g., HayneLeland and David Pyle
(1977) and Stephen Ross (1977)); as a way of completing markets (see, e.g.,
Joseph Stiglitz (1974) and Franklin Allen and Douglas GaLe (1988)); and as an
attempt to raise funds without diluting the value of equity (see Stewart
Myers and Nicholas Majluf (1984))}
While each of these approaches has provided important insights, none
hasbeen entirely successful in explaining the choice of financial structure.
In particular, these approaches cannot explain the types of debt claims
observed in practice. As one of us has argued elsewhere. (see Oliver Hart
(1993)). under the maintained hypothesis of most of the literature that
management is not self—interested, the first—best can be achieved by making
all of a firm's debt soft; that is, all debt should be Junior (management
should be given the right to issue unlimited amounts of additional debt
senior to existing debt) and postponable (all debt should be in the form of
payment—in—kind (P1K) bonds, which givc' ta.nagement the right to postpone debt
payments at management's direction). The reason is that, by issuing such
soft claims, the firm can take advantage of all the tax and market completion
benefits of debt without incurring any bankruptcy or financial distress
1costs. Efficient investment choices can be ensured by putting management on
an incentive scheme that rewards it according to the firm's total (net)
market value, rather than just the value of equity. Such an incentive scheme
also avoids conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors (of the
type stresed by Michael Jensen and William Heckling (i976)).2
In reality, firms issue considerable amounts of "hard" (senior.
nonpostponable) debt.3 That is, we do not appear to live in the tdelized
world described above. Presumably, the reason is that managers are
self—interested in practice (in this paper, we do not distinguish between
management andtheboardofdirectors). Amongotherthings, managers have
goals, such as the pursuit of power and perquisites, that are not shared by
investors. "Hard' debt then has an important role to play in curbing
managerial excess.4 First, nonpostponable, short—term debt forces managers
to disgorge funds that they might otherwise use to make unprofitable but
empire—building investments, and to trigger liquidation in states of the
world where the firm's assets are more valuable elsewhere, Second, senior
long—term debt prevents managers from financing unprofitable investments by
borrowing against future earnings. Hard debt may be put in place either by
the company's founders before thecompany goes public, or by management
itself in response to a hostile takeover bid.
The role of short—term debt in forcingmanagement to disgorge free
cash flow has been stressed by Jensen (1986),although he does not analyze
itformally.5in addition, Jensen emphasizes the benefits of debt, but
has little tosayabout the costs. The role of long—term debt in
constraining self—interested management from raising new capital has not been
2analyzed at all1 as far as we know. The purpose of this paper is to provide
-ananalysis ofthe costs and benefits of debt, with a particular emphasis on
long—termdebt.
We consider a public company, consisting of assets in place andnew
investment opportunities (along the lines of Myers (1977);inMyers' work,
however,management isnot self—interested). The company's security structure
ischosen at date 0. an investment decision is made by management at date 1,
and funds are paid out to investors at date 2 (there is symmetric information
throughout). We assume that management's empire—building tendencies are
sufficiently strong that it will always undertake the new investmentif it
can, even if the investmenthas negativenet present value. In order to
focus on the role of long—term debt, we assume that the firm's going concern
vat'seexceeds itsliquidation value, and thatthecompany's date 1 earnings
areinsufficient to finance the investment internally. Under these
assumptions, we show that the optimal level of short—term debt iszero.
However, (senior) long—term debt is important in constraining management's
ability to raise new funds. The trade—off for investors is the following.
If the company has little or no long—term debt, management will find it easy
to finance some negative net present value projects by borrowing against
(that is, diluting) future earnings from assets in place. That is, there
will be overinvestment. On the other hand, if the company has a large amount
of senior long—term debt, management will be unable to finance some positive
net present value projects because earnings from assets in place are
over—mortgaged (there is debt—overhang in the sense of Myers (1977)). That
is,there will be underinvestment.
3We use this trade—off to determine the company's optimal debt—equity
ratio and to derive a number of comparative statics results concerning the
relationship between the debt—equity ratio and the mean and ex ante variance
of the return on assets in place and on new investments.6 In fact, it turns
out that it is sometimes optimal for the company to issue a more
sophisticated set of claims than just senior debt and equity; in particular,
to Issue classes of debt of different seniorities, with covenants allowing
(limited) dilution of each class. This is observed in practice and is
analyzed In the paper. Finally, we show that our theory is consistent with
the two most striking facts about. corporate I inance (see Myers (i990)):
profitability and financial leverage are negatively correlated, and increases
in leverage raise market value.
It is useful to note some aspects of our theory of debt that
distinguish it from other agency theories in the literature. First, in most
of the literature, debt is equivalent to an incentive contract with
management of the form: "If you (the manager) do not pay Dt dollars to
security—holders at date t, then the company goes bankrupt, i.e. you lose
your Job." Given this, It is uncleir wtçanincentive contract of this form
would not be employed directly. In contrast, in our model, debt is not
equivalent to a contingent firing. Rather, debt regulates the manager's
ability to raise capital, making this sensitive to new information available
to the market at date 1 when investment decisions are taken. since we
Suppose this information to be observable but not verifiable, there is no
standard Incentive scheme that duplicates the optimal debt contract.
Second, much of the literature derives the optimal debt—equity ratio
4under the assumption that the company can issue only standard debt and equity
claims. In contrast. Section III considers the case where the company can
issue arbitrary claims (in some cases we show that the extra degree of
freedom will not be used). Thus the paper can be seen as a contribution to
the emerging literature on optimal security design (see the recent survey by
Harris and Raviv (1992)).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we lay out the basic
model, and obtain a sufficient condition for the optimal level of short—term
debt to be zero. Section II contains a number of results about the optimal
level of long—term debt. In Section Itt, w consider more general security
structures. Finally, Section IV concludes.
1. The Model
We use the following model, first laid out by Myers (1977).
Consider a firm consisting of assets in place and new investment
opportunities, which exists at three given dates (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 NEARHERE
At date 0 the firm's financial structure is chosen. At date 1 the assets in
place yield a return of y1 and a new investment opportunity costing I
Sappears. At thistime,the firm can be liquidated, yielding L (in addition
to the y1 already realized). We take both investment and liquidation to be
zero—one decisions.If the firm is not liquidated, at date 2 the assets in
place yield a further return y2 and the new investment opportunity ——ifit
was taken at date I ——yieldsr. At this date the firm is wound up. and
receipts are allocated to security holders.
The firm is run by a single manager. This manager decides whether to
take the new investment opportunity. The variables y1, y2, i, r, L are
typically uncertain as of date 0; however, their probability distribution is
coranon knowledge. All uncertainty about y1, y2, i, r and L is resolved at
date 1, and there is symmetric information throughout. However, y1, y2, i, r
and L, although observable, are not verifiable. In other words, these
variables cannot be the basis of an enforceable, contingent contract.7
Assume also, for simplicity, a zero interest rate, and that investors are
risk neutral. -
Althoughy1, y2, i, r, L are not verifiable, we suppose that the total
amount paid out to security—holders is verifiable. Thus securities can be
issued at date 0 with claims conditional on the amount that is paid out.
However, we do not allow claims to be issued on the return from the
investment, r. searateiy from the return from the assets in place,y2; that
is, we rule out project financing.8 Until Section iIi,we shall confine
attention to the case where the firm issues short—term debt due at date 1,
long-termdebt due at date 2,and equity; and for the time being we shall
suppose that both kinds ofdebt are senior, in the sense that any new claims
Issuedby the firm at date 1 are entitled to payment only if date 0
6debt—holders have been fully paid off. In Section llJ,we will investigate the
role of more sophisticated securities.
We also assume that it is prohibitively costly for the firm to
renegotiate with creditors at date 1. Thus if the firm defaults on its
short—term debt at date 1. then this triggers bankruptcy, which, in turn,
leads to liquidation; i.e. •Lis realized.9 (We discuss the no—renegotiation
assumption further in Section IV.
As emphasized earlier,we areinterestedin a situation
where managementmaycarry out some investment projects for power or
empire—building reasons even though they are unprofitable.1° To simplify, we
consider the (admittedly) extreme case where the empire—building motive is so
strong that no feasible financial incentive payment can persuade the manager
not to invest at date 1.11 At the same time we suppose that the manager's
empire—building tendencies are limited c a single, indivisibleproject.
That is, once the project is financed, the managerhas nofurther uses for
company funds, I.e. he (or sheicannot or does not wish to employ such funds
to make additional investments or to pay for perks or higher salaries (one
interpretation is that perks andsalariesare adequately controlled by other
mechanisms, e.g., incentive schemes).
12
Given these assumptions about empire—building behavior, the only way to
stop the manager from investing in the project is to prevent the necessary
fundsfrombeing made available at date 1. We also suppose thatthemanager
never liquidates the firm voluntarily at date 1, since this involves a loss
of power. In contrast, at date 2 there are no investment opportunities and
7so the manager is willingtopay out all accumulated funds (one
interpretation is that the manager retires and the firm is wound up at date
2).
The financialstructure ofthefirmis chosen at date 0 so as to
maximize the aggregate expected return of the security holders; i.e. to
maximize the f1rins date 0 market value. This may seem an odd assumption
given that financial structure decisions are typically made by management (or
the board of directors), and we have supposed management to be
self—interested. The assumption can be Justified in two ways. First, the
financial structure choice may be made, prior to a public offering at date 0.
by an original owner, who wishes to maximize his total receipts in the
subsequent offering (he is about to retire). Second, one can imagine that
the firm is initially all equity, and the threat of a hostile takeover at
date 0 forces management to choose a new financial structure which maximizes
date 0 market value (the hostile bidder is presentnow. but may not be around
at date 1. so management must bond itself now to act well in the future).'3
Define d1 to be the amount owed at date 1, andd2 to be the amount owed
at date 2 ——i.e.,c11 and d2 are the face values of short—term and long—ten
debt respectively. (Of course, at date 0 these debtclaims will typically
trade for less thin their face value because of therisk of default.) In
general1 the instruments d1 andd have distinct roles in curbing the
manager's empire building tendencies. Since the role of short—termdebt is
relatively well understood, in this paper we concentrateon the role of
l.ong—term debt. To this end, we nowpresent an assumption which implies that
it is optimal to setd1 =0.
8(Al) y1 < I and y2 t L with probability 1.
(Al) says that the manager can never finance the investment out of date
1 earnings (there is no free cash flow) and that it is never efficient to
liquidate the firm at date 1. (Al) may be plausible for the case of a growth
company that, at least initially, requires an injection of new capital to
prosper.
Tounderstand why (*1) implies thatthe optimal d1 is zero, consider
thesituationfacing the manager at date I. Given the manager's
enipire—buldingtendencies,his first choice is to invest (if he can raise the
funds).His second choice is to maintain the firm as a going concern (ifhe
can'tinvest, but can pay off his date I debts). His third choice is to
close the firm down (he does this only if he is forced to default at date I
and go bankrupt).
Now the firm's total revenues if the manager invests arey1 + y2 +
ofwhich d1 +ismortgaged to the old (senior) creditors. (Recall that
all uncertainty i resolved at date 1.) Hence the most the firm can borrow
at date 1 Is y1 ++ r—
d1
—
d2.It follows that the manager will invest






9If (1)is satisfied, the total return to date 0 claim—holders1 Ii, is
(2) Hy1y2+r—i,
of which date 0 creditors receive di +
*12and shareholders receive the rest.
Notice for future reference the two sourcesofinefficiency hen.
Sometimes the managerwillinvest even though r <1,because y1 +y2is big
relative to di +d2.Othertimes he wisi, be unable to invest even though r >
i,because y +y2is small relative to di +
if(1) is not, satisfied, the manager will be able to maintain the
firm as a going concern as long as





In the first case, the managerpays the date 1 debt out of current earnings.
while, in the second case, he pays it by borrowing out of futureearnings. If
(3)but not (1)is satjsfi the total return to date 0 claim—holders is
10(4) R =y1+y2.
Finally, if neither (1)nor (3) is satisfied, the firm is
liqr'dated at date 1 and
(5) R = y1+L.
Itshould now be clear why d1 0 optimal thatis,why d1 n0
maximizes the expected value of K. Only the sum d1 +d2
matters in (1) and
the second half of (3). ifowever, a low d is good in increasing the chance
that the first half of (3)is satisfied, i.e. minimizing the likelihood of
liquidation (liquidation is undesirable since, given y2 tL.(4) and (5)
imply that K is higher when the firm survives than when it is liquidated).
We have therefore established
Proposition1
Assume (Al). Then the date C market value of the firm is maximized by
14
settingd10.
In the next section, we analyse the optimal levelof long—term debt.
11II. Long Term Debt
For theremainderofthe paper we assume that(Al)holds, and so, by
Proposition I, the optimal d1 is zero. Thus liquidation never occurs at date
1 and L is irrelevant.
Denote by F(y1,y2,i,r) the probability distribution of y, y2, i and r,




isfixed, and so in evaluating the effects of different levels of d2 we can
locus on the net social return from the new investment, t —i.From (1). we
lakow that the investment goes ahead if and only ify +y2
+r—it and
soan optimal d2 solves:
(6) maximize J Cr —fl dF(y1•y2,i,r).
Y1+Y2+r—id2
The basic tradeoff isthe following. Thebenefit of a high d2 is that
t'ereturns from the assetsin place are mortgaged, which stops management
12from using them to subsidize bad investment projects. The cost of a high
isdebt overhang: given thatnewinvestors' claim are junior to the debt d2,
good projects cannot be undertaken if returns from existing assets are
ovraortgaged. Anoptimal d2 strikesthe right balancebetweenthese two
conflicting objectives.
There are four cases in which itispossible to obtain the first—best;
theseare grouped in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2
(1) If r is greater than i with probability 1, then the first—best can be
achieved by setting d2 equal to C (all equity).
(2) If r is less than I with probability 1, then the first—best canbe
achieved by setting d2 large enough.
(3) If +
y2equals some constantwith probability I, then the first—best
can be achieved by setting d2 equal to y.
(4) If i and y1 ai-e deterministic, and r m g(y2) where g(.) is a strictly
increasing function, then the first—best can beachieved by setting d2 equal
to y1 +g'(i).
Part (I) of Proposition 2 is immediate. Since there is no danger of the
13manager making anunprofitable investment, it is besttogive him the
flexibilityto raise as much money as he can at date 1, by having no debt.
The investment then always goes ahead, as required in the first—best. Part
(2) is the opposite extreme, where no investment is ever profitable. The
effect of a large aaount of senior (nondilutable) debt d2 is that the manager
is never able to raise further funds at t=i, and so the investment never goes
ahead.
Part (3) reveals quite a lot about the economics of the model. The
difficulty faced by those designing the security structure at date 0 is that the
uncertain returns y1 +y2from existing assets cannot be disentangled from
the uncertain returns r —ifrom new investment. As a result, there is a
dangerthat the manager will be able to finance the new investment at date 1
by borrowingagainst y2. However, the danger can be avoided if the total
return y1 +y2from existing assets is fixed, because this return can be
mortgaged away at date 0 by issuing senior, nondilutable debt. Themanager
then invests if and only if r is greater than i. Onepoint to observe here
is that the debty1 +y2is riskiess: however, this does not mean that it
does not play an Important role inpreventing the manager from making
unprofitable investments,
Part (4) is also revealing. If r sg(y2), and i and y1 are
deterministic then it is again possible in effect todisentangle the returns
from the existing assets and returns from thenew investment. Given d2 =
+ g1(j) themanager invests if and only if y2 +rexceeds i +g(i)——
sincer ag(y2),if and only ifris greater than i.
14In general the first-best cannot be achieved. Some insight into the
second—best can be obtained by differentiating (6). If F is a continuous
distribution, we can express the first—order condition for an interior
opt icum as
0') Etr—iy1+y2+r—i=d2] =0.
That is, d2 is set at a level such that thmarginalinvestment project just
breaks even.
We consider next some comparative static properties. Proposition 3
below shows how d changes with the means ofy1, y2, i and r.Part (Z) of
the Proposition uses the following condition.
Condition C The left hand side of ( 7 ), E(r—ijy1+y2+r—i=d21, is
continuously differentiable on an interval [.a2i. Moreover,
whenever C 7 ) holds, it is also the case that
(8) 0 CE(r—iIy1+y2+r—i=d2I
<1.
Denote r —Iby X and y1 +y2by Y. (8) says that E(XIX+Yd21
increases with d2, but by less than the amountd2 increases. Note that the
Isleft hand inequality in Condition C is simply the second order condition for
in (6),whichwill hold (albeit weakly) if (r —.i)and (y +y2
+r—
areaffiliated (that is, in a loose sense, positively correlated; see Paul
Milgrom and Robert Weber (1982). Theorem 5). The right hand inequality will
hold if, in addition, (y1 +y2)and (y1 +y2
+r—i)are affiliated.
Proposition 3
Suppose d2 is an optimum debt level.
(1) If a dollar is added to every realization ofy1, or added to every
realization of y2, then d2 +1is a newoptimum debt level.
(2)Assume thatConditionC holds, andthat d2is an interior optimumin
(inwhich case it is unique). If a small amountisaddedtoevery
realization of i, or subtracted from every realizationof r, then the optimum
debtlevel strictly increases.
Proposition3is proved in the Appendix. The intuition is
straightforward,An increase in y1 gives the manager wore cash with which to
invest at date 1. and so at the margin hisability to borrow should be
constrained, the debt level should rise. Equally,an increase in the mean of
y2 implies that the manager can borrow more at date 1 against the return from
the existing assets, andso, again, the debt level should rise. An increase
in the mean of t, or a decrease in themean ofr, implies that investments
16are less likely to be profitable, andthereforethe managershouldbe
constrained with higher debt.
Notice that part (1) of the Proposition says that d2 in fact moves
dollar—for-dollar with increases in y1 or y2. This follows directly from an
inspection of program C61:ifa dollar is added to every realization of y1
(or y2) and a dollar is added to d2, thentheset of states in which
investment goes ahead is unchanged(and thereturn from investment, r —I,is
also unchanged).
There are no comparably general results for how the optimal d2 changes
with the variances of y1, y2, i andr.However, it is easy to compute the
optimal d2, and therefore to see the variance effects, in two examples.
These examples also illustrate the mean effects from Proposition 3. For
simplicity, in both examples we assume that y1 and I are deterministic (with
yl <ii.
Example 1
y2 andrare independently andnormallydistributed with means Mv Mr
auvarianceso, 03Th Then by standarddistributiontheory the LHS of(7)
is simply
2
Mr -{ :Iz —
— — Mr+ii;
17and hencethe optimal debt level d2 is
2
2 16
(9) c12 = + 1.12—2r
—
Example2
and r are independently anduniformlydistributed on




< .<+ 5r(otherwise, by
Propositions 2(1) and 2(2), the optimal d2 would be either zero or infinity).
Also, to simplify the example, we assume that <s2.
-
Thereare two cases to consider; (a) the case where on average new
investment is profitable (tz >i);and(b)where it is unprofitable <
In case (a), the optimal debt leveld2 is indicated in Figure 2 ——
wherethe support of y1 +y2is the horizontal of the rectangle, andthe
support of r —jis the vertical (note that, since5rc s. the rectangle is
wider than it is tall). Notice that conditional on(y1 +y2)
+(r—1)=
d2
——. e.conditional on lying along the 135° line intersecting the rectangular
support ——theexpectation of r —iis zero, as required by (7).
FIGURE 2 NEAR HflE











Incase (b), a similar line of reasoning leads to
(11) d2 =y
+ + — — 5r+"'r
<i)
Inboth ExampLes 1 and 2, d2 rises with y1, rises with the mean of y2, falls
with i, and rises with the mean of r ——allas per Proposition 3. ALso, if
new Investment Is on average profitable (i.e., !'> i), then d2 falls with
the variance of y2, and rises with the variance of r.However, if new
investment is on average unprofitable (jiC1), these variance effects are
r;ersed: d2 rises with the variance of y2. and falls with the variance of r.
To understand the variance effects better, note that, in problem (6)
is set so that the market's assessment of future total return at date i
screens the quality of new investment appropriately. If y and i are
constant (as in Examples 1 and 2), the first—order condition (7)says that
the conditional ecpectation of r, E[rI.r=PJ, must equal I when P =d2
+I—
y1.Now as. the variance of y2, o-, rises relative to the variance of r,
19the fact that y2 + r =da
+ I —
y1reveals less Information about r —&(we
are looking at this from date 0, when r and I are uncertain). In the limit
as4 or 40, the LHS of (7 )becomessimply Mr —1, and the optimum
will not be interior. In the case where new investment is on average
profitable (Mr > Ii• it is best to give the manager maximum freedom to
finance new investment; i.e. to set d2 =0.In the case where new investment
is on average unprofitable (M C i). it is best to give the manager no
freedom to finance new investment; i.e. to set d2 =. Putsimply, if the
manager's ability to raise fresh capital at date 1 is almost entirely
determined by the realized returns from existing assets, then there Is little
point in using a security structure to screen out the bad new investments.
One may as well rely on prior (date 0) information ——i.e.whether or not new
investments are on average profitable.
Since the above intuition for the variance effects does nothinge on
the particular distributional assumptions ofExamples I or 2, we suspect that
it may be possible to establish a general result aboutthe effects of
increasing variance. We do not have such a result to report at thistime,
however.
III. eneral I.ong—Term SecurityStructures
In this sectjo we explore thepossibility that more sophisticated
long—term security structures thansips. debt may be optimai. We start by
laying out a quite general class ofsecurity structures, and give an example
20showing how the extra degrees of freedom help. The kind of securities we
introduce may at first sight seem rather foreign; but wego on to show that
they can be approximated by a conventional class of debt contracts based on
seniority. The section ends by consideTng under what circumstances one
would not need the additional flexibility offered by our general security
structure, and could instead merely rely on simple debt and equity (as in
Section II).
Recall that although y1, y2. i, r are not verifiable, the total amount
paid out to security-holders at date 2, denoted by F, is verifiable. Thus
securities can be issued at date 0 with claims conditional on P. The most
general long—term security structure consists of contingent debt, along the
following lines. The firm issues a single class of securities at date 0 with
an (enforceable) promise that if P dollars are distributed at date 2, this
class will collectively receive 0(P) of them, where 0 s 0(P) P.(The "0'
in 0(P) denotes the old, or original, date 0 security holders.) In addition,
management Is given permission to issue any new securities it likes at date
i. That is, management can earmark the residual amount N(P) E P —0(P)for
new investors at date I in the attempt to finance new investment. (The "N"
th N(P) denotes the new investors at date 1.) Note that a choice of 0(P)
close to or far away from P at date 0 constrains the firm more or less in its
investment choice at date
General long—term securities like 0(P) are not, to our knowledge,
observed. However, we show shortly that, under two mild assumptions, any
choice of 0(P) Is equivalent to a packoe of 'standard" securities,
consisting of equity and various seniorities of debt. Thus for the moment westick with the general specification 0(P). We continue to assume (Al)
18
throughout this section.
Given N(.) (or equivalently DC.)). consider the position of management
at date 1 once (y1, y2. i, r) are reaiized. Since y1 Is less than 1, the
manager can invest only if he can raise I —yfrom the market. If he does
Invest, P r +y2,and !o the most he can offer the market at date 2 is P —
OCr+y2)
=NCr+y2).It follows that the manager will be able to finance
the Investment if and only if N(r +y2)
tI—y.
As in (6)• anoptimal security structure at date 0 is represented by a
functionN(P),which solves:





(H) 0 S(p)s p.
So far we have allowed the slope of NC?) to be almost arbitrary. With
aminor modification inthe manager's set of available actions, however, we
can restrict N to have a slopebetween:.roandone. Assume that the manager
can commit himself at date 1 to lower the return both of the investment
project and of the assets in place. e.g. by selling off some fraction of the
22assets at an artificially low price or by hiring extra workers. Suppose that
NC?) >N(P')for some P C Pt Then tir tirm's date 0 market value can only
increase if NC?t) is raised to equal 14(P). The reason is that the low value
ofN(P)cannot be effective in deterring management from investing, since if
+rP and N(P) Ci—
y1
SN(P).the manager will raise the (I —
y1)
dollars necessary to invest by committing himself to lower total return from
to P. Thus if N(Pt) is raised to N(P), the same investment decisions
occur but total return is generally higher since the manager is not
encouragedto engage in wastage. Anextension of this argument shows that
date0market value can only increase if NC?) is replaced by sup(N(P)IPThP}
foreach P. This yields a monotonically increasing function NC?).
Asimilar argument shows that theslope ofN can be set less than or
equal to one, if the manager can alwaysraise morefunds than he needs for
the investment project and save the rest at the going rate of thterest.19
From now on. therefore, when we solve for the optimal security
structure we impose the extra constraint that N has slope between 0 and 1:
(14) 0 N(Pt)—N(P)P—P for allPS
Isall the flexibility afforded by this general security structure
useful?Example 3,which generalizes Proposition 2(4) to the caseof
uncertain I. shows that indeed it is.
23Example 3
Suppose y1 E0,andrE g(y2), where g(.) isa strictly increasing
function. Then one can obtain first—best by putting NO') =N,the (unique)
solution to
N +gt(N)=P.
(It is straightforward to confirm that (13) and (14) hold.) For a given r
(and hence y2 =gt(r)),the manager can raise up to NCr +y2)
to finance the
investment. But by construction1 N(r +y2)
=r.Moreover, since y1 =Othe
manager needs to raise the full cost i to make the investment which means
he will be in a position to invest if and only if r ti(i.e. the first—best
is implemented).
Our next task is to show that our general security structure NC?) can be
represented by a "standard package of securities, comprising equity and
noncontingent debt of various seniorities.
A standard package of debt and equity consists of n classes of debt and
a single class of equity. The Jth class of debt, j =I n, is
characterized by an amount collectively owed to class J at date 2 and a
maximum additional amount of indebtedness to class j that the firm can
24take on at date 1 (i.e. a covenant in the initial debt contract allows the
firmtoissue new debt at date 1 until the total amount owed class j is Di +
al)). Theclasses are ranked by seniority with 1 being the most senior (in
the sense that it must be paid off first) and n the most junior. The firm
can create an (n+i)th class of debt of any size at date 1, which is junior to
n+i
all existing debt, but senior to equity; in effect, A
This description of debt is consistent with what we observe in
practice. Firms do issue securities of different seniorities ——thetypical
order being secured debt, then various priority claims, then unsecured debt,
then subordinated debt, and finally equity. Horeover, firms retain the right
to issue further securities of comparable or higher seniority, but within
prespecified limits. For secured debt, these limits will be determined by
the amount of collateral still available; and also possibly by a negative
plef.,e clause, which prohibits the issuance of any new debt with a superior
claim to existing unsecured debt or which requires that unsecured creditors
be raised to equal status with subsequent claims. For unsecured debt, the
freedom to issue further debt is often constrained by covenants specifying
zo upperlimits on the ratio of debt to net worth or to tangible assets.
Let us now consider. the shape of functionP4(1') for the above
package of standard debt and equity. Suppose at date I the firm issues all
the additional debt AD1 ADn AD"1 that it is permitted to under the
date 0 covenants.I-low much will these various new issues fetch? Suppose it
is known at date I that the firm's date 2 pay—out will be P. For 0 SP5
+ AD1,only the most senior class of creditors receive any payment, and the
slope of Nfl') =tOt/(D1+ADh;the point is that, in this region, at date 2
25every dollar of P is divided in the proportionsftD1:D' between new and old
class I creditors. For D1 + < p +l+ + theslope of NC?)
=AD2/(021.AD2).here, at date 2 class 1 creditors (old and new) are fully
paid, and every dollar of the residual, P —Di— isdividedin the
proportions AD2:D2betweennewand old class 2 creditors; more junior
creditorsreceive nothing. And so on ...SeeFigure3.
FIGURE3NEAR HEBE
It follows from Figure 3 that a standard debt/equity packageyieldsa
particular function NC?) that satisfies (13)and(14).It is also clear
from Figure 3 thattheconverse holds, at least approximately: given any
function NC?) satisfying(13) and (14),wecan find astandard debt/equity
packagethat approximately implements it. Simply approximate the curve NC?)
by a piecewise linear graph whose slope always lies between 0 and I. Such a
piecewise linear graph is a representation of some standard debt/equity
security package.
The leading example of a standard package is the case of simple
debt/equity, which we examined in Section II. Namely, there is a single class
of debt that cannot be diluted: n =I,D' >0,and AD1 =0.To marry up with
Section II, et 31d2. Then NC?) reduces to Max (Nd 0). That is, for P
S
d2,all of P must be given to senior debt—holders and there is none for new
investors. On the other hand, for P >d2,the firm can issue Junior debt and
give P—d2 to new investors.
26In Section II, we proceeded on the assumption that nothing more
sophisticatedthan simpledebt/equity need be considered in many instances.
Itis time to justify thatassumption.Obviously, the four special cases
given in Proposition 2 are examples where simple debt/equity is optimal.
since in each case we are able to obtain the first best.Anothercase in
whichwe can besure that simple debt/equity is optimal is where i andy1are
deterministic:
Proposition 4
If I arid y1 are deterministic, then simple debt/equity is optimal.
Proof New investment occurs iff N(P) tI—
y1;i.e.. in view of (14 ).iffP
tsomecritical value PC, say. It follows that the optimum can be sustained
by a simple debt/equity structure with =3c—(i—
y1).
Q.E.D.
Note that Proposition 4 justifies our restriction to simple debt/equity
in Examples i and 2 in Section II.
The following lemma presents a general sufficient condition under which
simple debt/equity is optimal when i and/or are stochastic. We assume
that the distribution function F(y1,y2,i.r) satisfies:
27Condition F F(y11y2,i,r) is continuously distributed, and the Joint density




positive everywhere in the set T((P,N)IPSPS1';0 ￿NSP},where !and
are respectively the minimum and maximum possible value of r +y2.
Note that in choosing an optimal security structure N(P). given the
constraint (13),setT is the only relevant part of the support of
F(.y21i.r). For (P,N) ET,we define the following conditional
expectation:
K(P.N)= E(r—Lr+y2=P & i—y1=N).
KeyLemma Assume Condition F holds. A 'ig—term security structure
comprising simple debt d2 and equity is optimal If the fàilowing condition
holds:
Condition K For any pair (P',Nfl ET,




) 0if 0 s N—N () fl—P.
28To help shed light on condition K. it is useful to rewrite K(P,N) as
E(r—iIy1+y2+r—i=P—N & i—y1=tfl; viz. •theexpected return from the new
investment project, conditional on the total net profit equalling P —Nand
theamount of new financing equalling N.If this conditional expectation is
(strictly) increasing in (P—N) and (weakly) increasing in N ——i.e.•ifthe
project?s profit rises with both the total net profit and the external
2 i financing requirement ——thencondition K will hold.
The lemma is proved in the Appendix. A rough intuition is as follows.
K(P,N(P)) is the expected value of a marginal date 1 investment given a total
date 2 payout of P.Condition IC implies that there is a cutoff value of F,
say P •suchthat the expected value of a marginal date 1 investment is
negative(resp. positivel if P <P.(resp. P >I"J.Other things equal,
then, one would like to lower NO') for P 'CP,and raise NO') for P )P.
But we have to contend with the constraints (13 ) and (14 ).It should be
clear that a simple security structure comprising debtd2 =P— PUP') and
equity does a good job of balancing these goals (since N'(P) =0for P <P.
and N'(P) =Ifor? )F').
The result follows from the lemma.
29Proposition S
Assume Condition F holds. A long—term security structure comprising
simple debt d2 and equity is optimal if
(1) 1 is deterministic:
and (2) y1 is distributed independently of and r;
and (3) ELrIr+y2 =F]is strictly increasing in P. fors P S
ProofConditions (1) and (2) of the Proposition jointly imply that K(P.N) is
independent of N. And together with Can'ition (3), they imply that IC(P,N) is
strictly increasing in P. hence Condition IC is satisfied. Now apply the
lemma.
0. E. D.
Note that Condition (3) of Proposition 5 is very natural, and will hold
(at least weakly) if r and r+y2 are affiliated. The intuition behind the
result is that, when i is fixed, new investment should not occur for low
values of r÷y2 ——sincethis signifies low r, on average; whereas the
investment shouldgo ahead for high values ofr÷y2. A simple debt/equity
security structure implements this quite well.
Our final result concerns the opposite case to Proposition S.
30Proposition 6
AssumeCondition F holds. If
(1) r is deterministic
and(2)y2 is independent of and I
and(3) E(iji—y1N)is strictly increasing in N,forSHs F,
thenit is optimal at date 0toissue two classes of debt: a negligible
amountofsenior debt, with anoptionto borrow a finite amountofadditional
debt of the same seniority at date 1 (d10. Ad >0);and a large amountof
a second class of debt with no option to borrow any more (d2 w,Ad20).
Ina sense the optimal security structure in Proposition 6 is the
obverse of simple debt/equity: the managercan raisethe first Ad1 of anyF,
butno more (NO') =mm{P,Ad1}).Theintuition is that, given a fixed r,
low/high values of i represent good/bad investment opportunities andshould
beencouraged/discouraged. To this end, themanagerisgiven an "overdraft
facility"of Ad1.
We do not give aformal proof of Proposition 6, since itis similar to
theproofs of the lemma and Proposition 5 ——withCondition K replaced by:
K(P,N)independent of P and strictly decreasing in N, for (P,N) ET.
31IV. Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper, we have explored the role of long—term debt in
preventing self—Interested management from financing unprofitable
investments. We have shown that in those cases where simple debt and equity
are optimal: the higher is the average profitability of a firm's new
investment project, the lower will be the level of long—term debt; and the
higher is the average profitability of a fira's existing assets (assets in
place), the higher will be the level of long—term debt. We have also shown
that, in general, it is optimal for a firm to issue classes of debt of
different seniorities, with covenants a'.J1ing (limited) dilution of each
class. Finally, we have derived sufficient conditions for the additional
flexibility afforded by different classes not to be useful; that is, for
simple debt and equity to be optimal.
It should be noted that some of our predictions are novel. For example.
a theory which trades off the tax benefits of debt against the bankruptcy
costs of debt would not distinguish between assets in place and new
investments, and would predict a positive correlation between profitability
and the debt level. In contrast, our theory explains the observedstrong
negative correlation between profitability and leverage (see Carl Kester
(1986) and Myers (1990)), as long as high profitability is associated with new
projects; this is Myers' (1990) first "striking fact." Note that we can
also explain Myers second striking fact. Consider acompany that for some
reason —perhapshistorical —has(relatively) little debt, and suppose the
company faces the threat of a hostile takeover. Then, according to our theory,
the managers may engage in a debt—equityswap —thatis, borrow and use the
proceeds to pay a dividend or buy back equity —inorder to commit themselves
not to undertake future (bad) investments (thereby persuading shareholders
32not to tender to the raider). Under these conditions, increases in leverage
and increases in market value will move together.24
&s noted in the Introduction, however, perhaps a more important
difference between our theory and most others in the literature is that other
theories cannot explain the fact that firms issue hard (senior.
nonpostponable) debt claims, whereas our theory can explain this.
An important assumption that we have made is that a firm cannot
renegotiate with its claim—holders at date I when a new investment project
becomes available. Note that, if renegotiation were costless, there would be
no disadvantage in having high debt since if the new project had positive net
present value the creditors would always be prepared to renegotiate their
claims so as to allow the project to go ahead. Thus in a world of costless
renegotiation, it would be optimal to have infinite (or very high) debt, in
effect forcing the firm to return to the capital market ——or,to put it
another way, to seek permission from its creditors ——forevery new
investment.
Such an extreme outcome is unrealistic, and there are strong
theoretical reasons why. Because investors are wealth—constrained and risk
averse, a major cdrporation will typically be financed by a sizable number of
small investors, rather than just a small number ofvery large ones. But
this means that free-rider and hold—out problems are likely to make
renegotiation difficult. In particular, if the debt level is too high to
allo.. positive NP'! project to take place, then while it is in the
collective interest of creditors to forgive a portion of the debt, it is in
33any small creditor's interest to refuse to forgive his share since the chance
that his decision will affect the outcome is very small.25 Thus in many cases
one would expect the renegotiation process to break down and investment not
to occur; moreover the evidence of Gilson et.al. (1990) suggests that
26
renegotiation frequently does fail in practice.
One possible way round the free—rider problem is to include a provision
in the initial debt contract that the aggregate debt level can be reduced as
long as a majority of creditors approvt' n.e. the majority's wishes are
bindingontheminority). Itturns out thatthe Trust Indenture Act of 1939
makessuch a provision illegal in the U.S. for public debt. However, even if
it were legal, there are strong theoretical reasons for thinking that it
would not solve the problem. For majority rule to work welt, individual
investors must keep abreast of the firm's progress and have very good
information about a firm's investment prospects.. This is a very demanding
requirement in a complex world where most of investors' time is quite
properly allocated to other activities. In other words, our assumption that
the profitability of new investment is public information should not be taken
literally ——itis meant to apply to the most sophisticated arbitrageur.
rather than to the average investor. Thus to make the firm's investment
decision depend on a majority vote of average investors would be rather like
running the firm by a not very well informed committee ——aprocedure whose
record of success historically has been less than outstanding.27
For these reasons, our assumption that renegotiation is impossible does
not seem an unreasonable theoretical simplification forcompanies with
widely—held debt.
34There are a number of possible extensions of the analysis. An obvious
one is to increase the numberofperiods. This raises at least two new ——
andfar from straightforward ——issues.First, in a multiperiod model,
managementfacesthe choice of raising capital for investment today or
waiting to invest untiltomorrow.in order to decide WhiChchoiceis
preferred, one needs to know how management trades off different sizes of
empires at different moments in time. In other words, the multiperiod
extension requires the specification of an interteaporal managerial utility
function, whereas the two period model required only the assumption that
managementprefers more investment to less.
A second complication is that the interpretation of seniority becomes
less clear—cut. To give an example: in what sense does a senior debt claim
tssued at date 1 with a promise to pay one dollar at date 4 have priority
overa Junior debt claim issuedat dateZwhich promises to pay one dollar at
date3? The answer is that it depends on whether the firm goes bankrupt.if
it does, the first claim is senior, but if It does not the second claim may
beseniorbecause itispaid off first. in other words, the notion of
senioritythat we have analysed must be enlarged to encompass seniority in an
Intertemporal sense.
Finally, our analysis hascompletelyignored the role of shareholder
voting and takeovers In a firm's choice of financial structure. Yet voting
and takeovers are important restraining forces on management. In future work
Itisdesirable to develop a framework which permits a study of the interplay
beti.ieen debt and the market for corporate control as constraints on
managerial behaviour.
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Fl1flhlton Harris and Artur Raviv (1991) survey these theories. A more recent
literature has viewed debt as a way of shifting control rights from corporate
insidersto security—holders in certain (bankruptcy) states of the world (see
Philippe Aghion and Patrick Dalton (1992) and Oliver Hart and John Moore
(1989, 1994)). Control—based theories seem more applicable to smallish,
entrepreneurial firms than to public companies (the focus of this paper); in
the latter, managers or directors rarely have voting control even when the
company is solvent.
2For details, see Hart (1993). A relatedpoint has been made by Philip
Dybvig and Jaime Zender (1991).
3Clifford Smith and Jerold Warner (1979) found thatin a random sample of
eighty—seven public issues of debt registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission between January 1974 and December 1975, more than 907. of
the bonds contained restrictions on the issuing of additional debt. Although
the strength of such debt covenants declined during the 1980s, it is still
very common for nw public debt issues to contain some restrictions on new
debt. See Kenneth Lehn and Annette Poulsen (1991).
4See Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (1982).5Some formal analysis is provided by kane Stulz (1990) and Cuozhong Xie
(1990).
6The trade—off between overinvestment and underinvestment has also been
analyzed recently by Elazar Berkovitch and E. HanKim (1990). Stulz (1990).
Xie (1990). and Robert Gertner and David Scharfsteln(1991).StuI.z and Xle
consider models in which high short—term debt is good inthat it forces
management to pay out funds, but bad because it leads toinefficient
piecemeal liquidation in the event of default (with, inStulz's case, a loss
of investment opportunities); Stulz and Xle do not consider the roleof
long—term debt in preventing the firm from raising new capital.Berkovitch
and Kim and Gertner and Scharfstein do consider the role of long—term debt,
but assume that managers act on behalf of shareholders; that is, management
is (implicitly) assumed not to be self—interested. As we have noted, if
management is not sell—interested, the first—best can be achieved by putting
management on an appropriate incentive scheme and making all of the firm's
debt junior and postponable.
7For exaulpie, a statement in the corporate charter stipulating that
management should invest if and only if rI is unenforceable since a
disinterested judge or jury would not know whether r tI.A statement that
management must pay out all earnings at date 1 (that is, all of y1, whatever
y1 may be) is urienforceabie for similar reasons,
P3If project financingwere possible,thenewInvestment.could be financedas
astand—alone entity, whose merit could 'ic ssessed by the market at date1;
and debtlevels could be set veryhighto prevent the managerusing funds
fromthe existing assets to subsidize investment. There are several reasons
for ruling out project financing. First, it maybe that Irepresents an
incremental investment ——e.g.,maintaining or improving the existing assets
——andthe final return y2 +ris simply the overall return from the (single)
project. Second, it maybethat the same management team looks after both
the old assets andthenew project, and canusetransfer pricing to
reallocate profits between them; hence the market cankeeptrack only of
total profits. Finally,even if project—specific financing is feasible,It
isnot at all clear that managerswill want to finance a project that is
notpart of their empire since they will not enjoy the private benefits of
control (on this, see Shan Li (1993)).
9We ignore more sophisticatedbankruptcy systems that try to preserve the
firm's going-concern value; examples are US Chapter ii or.the procedure
discussed in Philippe Aghion et.al. (i992).
t0ThIs is In the spirit of theearly managerial literature of William Baumol
(1959). Robin Man-is (1964) and Oliver Williamson (1964). as well as of the
later work of Jensen (1986). For empirical support, see Gordon Donaldson
(1984).
F4suppose thatthemanager has no (or little) initial wealth and so cannot
be charged up front for empire—building benefits.
distinguishes our model from a "pure free cash flow model" of the
Jensen (1986) variety. In a pure free cash flow model, the manager always
has further uses of company funds and so will squander each dollar of
investor returns that is not mortgaged to creditors. Thus in a free cash
flow model the value of equity is zero. in contrast, in our model, as the
reader will shortly see, the value of equity can be positive.
Note that this is not a critical difference between the two analyses since
our main results would still hold under the more extreme Jensen assumptions.
A more important difference between the models is that ours explicitly
considers the costs as well as the benefits of short and long—term debt.
t3Both of these scenariosare of course special. We believe that the thrust
of our analysis applies also to the case where management chooses financial
structure to maximize its own welfare. In the present three date model, this
leads to the trivial outcome of no debt (managementclearly prefers not to be
wider pressure from creditors). However, in a model withmore periods
management may issue (senior) debt vol' ,r arily, since this may be the only
way to raise funds from investors concerned that their claims may be diluted
if management undertakes bad investments in the future. Onthis, see Jeffrey
Zweibej (1993).
F514Notice that we are ruling out the possibility of negative debt. For
example, a negative d1 ——ineffect a prearranged boost to y1 ——allowsthe
manager to make an investment without the need to go to the market at date 1,
even when y c I.This may be helpful if the profitable investments are
small ones. A negative d1 may be hard to implement, however. It may be
impossible to arrange for dispersed creditors to pay in moneyat date i;and
if themanager is given the money at date 0he may use it tomake an
unprofitable date 0investment.
t5Strictly speaking, we ought to truncate the distributions ofy
andr so
thatthey are nonnegative. See our 1990 Working Paper for further details.
16Example 1 is easily generalised to allow for correlation betweeny2 and r.
Iftheir correlation coefficientisp, then the optimald2is given by
a
C2 + = y1+—
a+
Notethat the denominator r2+itt,sitive from the second order
condition. Thus, provided the numerator +'°'tr
is positive ——whichit
will be unless <p (—c2/cr)
——thecomparative statics results
reported in the text continue to hold.
F617One can think of even more general securities.One possibility is that 0(P)
could be conditioned on the amount of money raised at date I. However, our
preliminary investigations suggest that the extra degree of freedom would not
help.
Another possibility is that 0(F) could be sensitive to the market value of
securities. The difficulty with this is that there is a tricky bootstraps
effect: market values are affected by the manager's actions, whichare in
turn constrained by the form of 0(P).
l8 is straightforward toconfirm that Proposition I continues to apply, even
when more sophisticated long—term securitiesare admitted. That is• there is
no role for short—term securities ——likeshort—term debt d1 ——whichpromise
to pay out at date 1.
t9The argument isas follows. Suppose P C P and N(P) —N(P)> p,
Then the firm's date 0 market value will notchange if NC?) is raised to
— +P. The reason is that ify2+ r Pand N(P) ci —y
SN(Pt)
—P+ P ,themanager can raise — +(P —P) dollars from the
market, invest I in the project and save theremaining Ø) —F).This
yields a total date 2 return of out of which the manager can repay new
security—holders up to N(P) t — + (p —F).Again this argwment Can
be extended to show that date 0market value will be unchanged if P4(P) is
replaced by sup((N(p) —?+PflPP}This yields a function 11(P) whose
slope is less than or equal to one.
F?20For a discussion of covenants used in practice, see Sitith and Warner(1979)
and Lain and Poulsen (1991). For an example of a bond prospectus (Potomac
Electric Power Co.) with essentially the toni of our standard debt/equity
package, see Brealey and Myers (1988). pp 591—599.
21We are grateful to a referee forpointing this out.
Note that there Is no inconsistency betweenProposition 5 and Example 3. If
I is deterministic and y1 =0,r Sg(y2),then there is indeterminacy in the
optimal security structure.
23ikjasured profitability reflects theprofitability of assets in place.
However, if the profitabilities of assets in place and new investments are
positively correlated, then measured profitability may serve as a proxy for
the profitability of new investments.
24For details, see Hart (1993).Other bonding theories, such as those in
Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (i9*so), can also explain this
observation. --
25See,for example. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991).
F8261n a study of the companies listed on the New York and American Stock
Exchanges that were in severe financial distress during 1978-1987, Gilson
et.al. (1990) found that workouts failed more often than 50 percent of the
time, and were more likely to fail the larger the number of creditors. See
also Gilson (1991).
27To put it anotherway, to the extent that (dispersed) creditors are poorly
informed, any debt forgiveness is likely to be insensitive to the ex post
realizations of y1, y2, r and i; that is, debt forgiveness will be
approximately a fixed amount d'. But then the same outcome could be achieved
by setting the original debt level equal to d2 —d';i.e.1 debt forgiveness
serves no useful role.
F9Appendix
In this Appendix, we prove Proposition 3 and the Key Lemma.
Proof of ProposItion 3
Part (I) follows immediately from an inspection of program ( 6 ).







=0 by the right hand inequality in
Condition C and by ( 7 ).
Hence,from the left hand inequality in Condition C, it follows that the new
debt lever strictly exceeds d2. An identical argument can be used for the
case where c >0is subtracted from every realization of r.
Q.E.D.
AlProof of Key Lemma
Let C be the class of admissible security structures N satisfying (13)
and(14).and let V(N) denote the integral in (12). Note that C is convex:
AN +(i—A)HE C for any N.M E C andany 0s X s 1.If N is an optimal





(N(P)-H(P)1K(P,N(P)) f(P,N(P)) dP 0.
p=P
where,by Condition r, the Joint density f(P.N(P))>0 for P ' P P.
LetP =inf(PIPP K(P,N(P)) > 0}. Condition K implies that
K(P,N(P)) 0 for all P s P C F., andK(P,N(p))0 for all P C P P.
Suppose N(P) is not a simple debt/equity security structure in the
relevant domain (viz., p p P).Thenconstruct a security structure H
compi-islng simple debt d2 and equity, where
F' —N(Pfl.
(We know that thisd2 tO, since N satisfies (13).) Thatis,M(P') =PUP').
In the light of the fact that N satisfies (13)and (14),M(P)￿ N(P) for
AZall P P < P, and MC?) t P4(P) for all P < PP. Thus the left hand Side
of (A.l) is at most zero.
Moreover, since N * H, there must be some open interval S C (P,PJ, not
containing P, such that,forall P E S. both (1) 14(P) * 14(P). and (ii) 14(r)
—14(P)z —P.From Condition K, (ii) implies K(P,14(P)) * 0 for all P E S.
But this means that the left hand side of (A.l) is in fact strictlynegative;
a contradiction. Hence a simple debt/equity security structure is optimal.
Q.E.D.
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